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The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes:
Valuing Estate Tax Marital and
Charitable Deductions After Hubert
HEATHER J. KIDWELL*
"Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends. In cases like the
one before us today, they can be complete strangers. That our tax laws can
at times be in such disarray is a discomforting thought."'
INTRODUCTION
On March 18, 1997, almost eleven years after eighty-year-old Georgia resident
Otis C. Hubert died leaving $30 million to his wife and to charity,2 the Supreme
Court affirmed the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and the Tax Court in
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert,3 ruling in favor of the estate against an
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") challenge.4 The Court rejected the
Service's argument that Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) required the
estate to reduce its marital and charitable deductions5 by the amount of
administration expenses6 charged to income earned during administration on
assets allocated to the marital and charitable bequests.7 The regulation requires
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Special thanks
go to Alan Spears, Indiana University Foundation's Director of Major and Planned Gifts, for
suggesting this Note topic; and to Professor Steve Johnson for his helpful comments and
suggestions. This Note is dedicated to Joe Kidwell, Jerry and Barb Miller, and Heidi Tomquist
for their boundless encouragement, love and support over the years.
1. Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Sonnebom Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds, J.,
concurring)).
2. See Justices to Resolve Estate Tax Dispute; The IRS Contends that a Marietta Man's
Estate Still Owes $154,000, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Apr. 30, 1996, at A5.
3. 117 S. Ct. 1124 (1997) (7-2 decision with no majority opinion), affg 63 F.3d 1083
(11th Cir. 1995) (2-1 opinion), affg 101 T.C. 314 (1993) (15-2 reviewed opinion).
4. See id The IRS issued a notice of deficiency in 1990, claiming the estate underreported
its federal estate tax liability by more than $14 million. The IRS notice asserted that the
property passing to Mrs. Hubert and to charity did not qualify for the marital and charitable
deductions, respectively, for reasons not relevant here. The estate petitioned the Tax Court for
a redetermination of the deficiency. Shortly thereafter, the estate settled other litigation in
which it was involved, and the settlement agreement provided that the marital and charitable
shares would pass in trust. The IRS stipulated that the nature of the trusts did not prevent them
from qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions. See id. at 1127-28. The IRS then
raised a new issue, not asserted in its notice of deficiency, contending that the marital and
charitable deductions had been overstated. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Hubert (No. 95-
1402). Newspapers reported that the asserted deficiency was only $154,000 by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Eva M. Rodriguez, Supreme Court Rules Against
IRS in Dispute Tied to Estate Taxes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, at B8.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 72-88 for a discussion of marital and charitable
deductions.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 68-71 for a discussion of administration expenses.
7. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1128.
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that any "material limitations" on a spouse's right to income be taken into account
when valuing a marital bequest for purposes of the marital deduction
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hubert to resolve a split between the
Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth and Federal Circuits that was created when the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Hubert.9 The Supreme
Court's decision means that, when state law and a decedent's will authorize, an
executor may charge administration expenses to post-mortem income allocable
to marital and charitable bequests and claim an income tax deduction without
reducing the value of the estate tax marital and charitable deductions, at least in
some cases. In exactly which cases is still unresolved, because a majority of the
Court could not agree on what constitutes a material limitation on a surviving
spouse's right to income for purposes of valuing the marital deduction. The case
spawned four separate opinions from the Court, with none supported by a
majority of the Justices. 0
In response to the Supreme Court's splintered decision in Hubert, the IRS
issued Notice 97-63, "Material Limitation on Surviving Spouse's Right to
Income."" In it, the Service asks for public comment on three alternatives for
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4 (as amended in 1994). The regulation provides as follows:
Marital deduction; valuation of interest passing to surviving spouse.
(a) In general The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any
deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to
be determined as of the date of the decedent's death [unless the estate] elects the
alternate valuation method .... The marital deduction may be taken only with
respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent
to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applicable as if the amount of
a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the
interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of
any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example
of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the
benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date
of the decedent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be
used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate.
Id.
9. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1128. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Tax Court's decision,
attaching the Tax Court's opinion as an appendix to its own and adopting it "as completely as
if[it] had set it forth [t]herein." Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11 th
Cir. 1995), af'd, 117 S. Ct. 1124 (1997). Thus, references to the Tax Court's opinion should
be understood to encompass the Eleventh Circuit's opinion as well. The Eleventh Circuit
expressly recognized that its decision brought it in conflict with the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992), and the Federal Circuit's
holding in Burke v. United States, 994 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See Hubert, 63 F.3d at
1083. See also infra text accompanying notes 116-131 for a discussion of the Sixth and Federal
Circuits' cases.
10. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1127, 1134, 1139, 1146. Justice Kennedy wrote for the
plurality and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg; Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Thomas; Justice
Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Breyer; Justice Breyer also wrote
a dissenting opinion. See also infra Part IV for a discussion of the points to which a majority
of Justices agreed, despite writing four separate opinions.
11. I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
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proposed regulations that it and the Treasury Department are considering. The
proposed regulations will provide definitive guidance on when the use of income
from property to pay administration expenses is a material limitation on a
spouse's right to income. 2
This Note evaluates the alternatives proposed by the IRS, as well as other
theories advanced by commentators. Part I provides background by detailing the
facts of Hubert and summarizing the IRS's argument and the Supreme Court's
decision in the case. Part II provides a framework for the discussion following it
by describing the interrelationship of estate tax, income tax, and fiduciary
accounting in the context of Hubert. Part III examines the rationale and evolution
of the cases that resulted in the split of authority among the circuit courts. Part IV
discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Hubert, highlighting the points that a
majority of the Justices agreed to despite writing four separate opinions. Finally,
Part V analyzes the various alternatives proposed for providing taxpayers with
guidance. It concludes that the proposed regulations should be based on a
variation of the IRS's second alternative, whereby a safe harbor amount of
administration expenses may be charged to the income of a marital or charitable
bequest without reducing the value of the marital or charitable deduction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of Hubert
Shortly after Mr. Hubert's death his estate became involved in probate and civil
litigation, beginning with will contests filed by Mrs. Hubert and their three
daughters. 3 The contests charged that the attorney who drafted Mr. Hubert's last
will and its three codicils was unfit to serve as co-executor, was an incompetent
witness to the will, and had exercised undue influence over Mr. Hubert in favor
of the charitable beneficiaries. The attorney was Mr. Hubert's nephew. He
responded with civil suits seeking damages for slander and harm to his
reputation. 4 Following negotiations between the family members and
12. See id.
13. Otis Colley Hubert died June 2, 1986. He was survived by his wife, Ruth Swann
Hubert; a son, Richard N. Hubert; three daughters, Marilyn Kemper, Judy Manning, and
Deborah Jones; and eight grandchildren. Mr. Hubert was a graduate of Georgia Tech Evening
School (now Georgia State University) and Woodrow Wilson School of Law, and served in the
Navy during World War II as a lieutenant commander. After the war he and other family
members formed Hubert Realty Co. Besides being a developer, real estate broker, and lawyer,
Mr. Hubert was chairman of the board of the Georgia Motor Club, president of the Atlanta
Jaycees, and a trustee of Shorter College. See O.C. Hubert, Cobb Realtor, Developer, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., June 4, 1986, at E9.
14. See Vicki C. Irwin, Note, Tax Law: Administrative Expenses and the Charitable and
Marital Deductions-The Potentially Painfid Surprise of a 642(g) Election, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 501, 529 & n.235 (1994); see also Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1127.
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representatives for the charities, 5 the Cobb County, Georgia Superiors and
Probate Courts approved a final settlement agreement and accepted it as binding
on all interested parties. 6 Four and one-half years had elapsed since Mr. Hubert's
death, and $2 million in administration expenses, including attorneys' fees, had
been incurred.' 7
The final settlement agreement divided Mr. Hubert's residuary estate 8 of
approximately $26 million almost equally between a marital share and a
charitable share.' 9 The residuary marital share was payable to two trusts, a marital
trust over which Mrs. Hubert had a general power of appointment ("GPA"),2" and
a qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP") trust.2 ' The rest of the residue
went to the charities.22
The agreement preserved the discretion that Mr. Hubert's will had given his
estate's executors "'to charge any expenses against income or principal or
apportion the same."'23 This discretion was in accordance with Georgia law,
which authorizes the allocation of administration expenses to income instead of
principal if the will so provides.24 The executors charged about $500,000 to
principal as funeral and administration expenses, and charged the remaining
administration expenses to income. The expenses charged to principal reduced
the amount of date-of-death corpus that the beneficiaries otherwise would have
received.
15. The Georgia Revenue Commissioner and the Georgia Attorney -General served as
representatives for the charities. See Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314, 317
(1993).
16. On November 28, 1990, the Cobb County Probate Court entered a final order adopting
the Superior Court's Order, Judgment, and Decree. See id.
17. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1128.
18. The residuary estate is "[tihat which remains after debts and expenses of administration,
legacies, and devises have been satisfied. That portion of [a] person's estate which has not
otherwise been particularly devised or bequeathed .... Gross estate less all charges, debts,
costs, and all other legacies." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1309-10 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1128.
20. In a marital deduction power of appointment trust, the trust income is payable to the
surviving spouse for life; she is granted the power to appoint the property to herself, her estate,
her creditors, or the creditors of her estate; and no other person can be a beneficiary of the trust
while she is alive. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1994); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Estate Tax Marital
Deduction, [843 Estates, Gifts, and Trusts] Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A-42 (Aug. 5, 1996).
2 1. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 317. In a qualified terminable interest property trust, the trust
income is payable to the surviving spouse for life, but she is not granted a general power of
appointment over the property. Property in a QTIP trust qualifies for the marital deduction to
the extent the executor so elects on the decedent's estate tax return. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (6th ed. 1990).
22. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 317. It is unclear whether the charities received their share
outright or in trust. While the Tax Court opinion states that the charities "received the rest of
the residue outright," id., the Supreme Court opinion states that the charitable share was paid
to a trust, see Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1128.
23. Hubert, 101 T.C. at 322 (quoting Mr. Hubert's 1982 will).
24. See id. at 324 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-2-101, 53-15-3 (1982)); see also Hubert,
117 S. Ct. at 1128.
25. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 322.
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Accordingly, the executors reduced the marital and charitable deductions by the
amount of the expenses charged to principal, and claimed estate tax deductions
for funeral and administration expenses instead. 6 The executors did not deduct
the administration expenses charged to income on the estate tax return. Rather,
these expenses were deducted on the estate's income tax returns pursuant to an
election provided by Internal Revenue Code ("Code") § 642(g). The executors
did not reduce the estate tax marital and charitable deductions by the amount of
the expenses deducted on the income tax returns." During the period of
administration the estate generated more than $4.5 million in gross income.28
B. The IRS's Argument
The IRS argued that the estate tax marital and charitable deductions must be
reduced by the amount of administration expenses charged to estate income and
deducted on the income tax returns. The IRS supported its position by citing
Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a),29 which states that account must be
taken of any "material limitations" on a spouse's right to income when valuing a
marital bequest for purposes of the marital deduction." Although no similar
regulation exists with respect to the charitable deduction, courts generally read
the provision in pari materia for both the marital and charitable deductions.3'
The regulation does not define "material limitations," but explains that such a
limitation "may" exist in the case of a marital bequest in trust when income
earned during administration is used to pay administration expenses.32 The IRS
interpreted the regulation as requiring a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the marital
deduction any time administration expenses are charged to the income earned by
property in the marital bequest.33 That is, the IRS argued that any use of income
to pay administration expenses is, per se, a material limitation.34 Consequently,
the Commissioner did not argue that the specific amount charged to income in
Hubert, $1.5 million, was quantitatively material." Nor did she argue that as of
26. See Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124 (No. 95-1402).
27. See id.
28. See Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 1083, 1084 (1 th Cir. 1995), aft'd, 117
S. Ct. 1124 (1997).
29. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1131.
30. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (as amended in 1994). See also supra note 8 for a
reproduction of the regulation.
31. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1139 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a).
33. See Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314, 322-23 (1993).
34. See I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
35. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1138 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It appears from the record
that the Commissioner elected to marshal all her resources behind the proposition that any
diversion of postmortem income was material, and never presented any evidence or argued that
$1.5 million was quantitatively material.") (emphasis omitted).
1998]
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Mr. Hubert's date of death, the expected future administration expenses were
quantitatively material. 6
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court disagreed with the IRS that the regulation called for a
mandatory reduction in the marital deduction any time administration expenses
were charged to income from the marital property. 7 Instead, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the plurality, agreed with the Tax Court that the regulation was
"'merely a valuation provision,"' and that not every limitation on a surviving
spouse's right to income from property would necessarily be a material limitation
requiring a reduction in the marital deduction.38 Writing for the concurring
members of the Court, Justice O'Connor likewise found that "some financial
burdens on the spouse's right to post-mortem income will reduce the marital
deduction; others will not .... That a limitation affects the marital deduction only
upon reaching a certain quantum of substantiality is not a concept alien to the law
of taxation; such rules are quite common."39 Because the IRS bore the burden of
proving materiality40 and had not argued that the specific amount of expense in
Hubert was material, the Court found that it had no basis to overturn the Tax
Court's holding for the estate.4'
II. ESTATE TAX, INCOME TAX, AND FIDUCIARY
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Although the testamentary scheme in Mr. Hubert's estate was similar to fairly
common estate plans,42 the issue addressed in the case is complex. It has caused
the IRS and fiduciaries to battle,43 commentators to debate," and courts to
36. See id at 1132. The plurality embraced an estate tax valuation theory that focused on
the present value of anticipated administrative expenses and anticipated income as of the
decedent's date of death. See id. at 1129-32.
37. See id. at 1131, 1137-38.
38. Id. at 1131 (quoting Hubert, 101 T.C. at 324).
39. Id. at 1137-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 1139. The IRS bore the burden of proof on all factual matters because the
issue being litigated had not been asserted in its deficiency notice. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P.
142(a). See also supra note 4 for a discussion of the deficiency notice issued by the IRS.
41. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1132, 1138.
42. See I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6 ("The facts in Estate of Hubert are similar
to the following common fact pattern.").
43. See David Pratt, Administration Expenses Charged to Post-mortem Income: Hubert and
Beyond, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 19.
44. See, e.g., Farhad Aghdami, Payments Out of Postmortem Income: Impact on Estate Tax
Marital and Charitable Deductions, 49 TAX LAW. 707 (1996) [hereinafter Aghdami,
Payments]; Pamela R. Champine, Paying Administration Expenses Out of Income Attributable
to Marital and Charitable Residuary Bequests: Double Dipping or Appropriate Accounting?,
14 VA. TAX REv. 507 (1995); Martha W. Jordan, The Impact on the Marital Deduction of
Expenses Chargeable to Post-Mortem Income: Does United States v. Stapf Answer the
Question?, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73 (1996); Vicki C. Irwin, Note, Tax Law: Administrative
Expenses and the Charitable and Marital Deductions-The Potentially Painful Surprise of a
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disagree.45 The complexity results from the interaction of the estate tax laws, the
income tax laws, and fiduciary accounting principles. As commentators have
noted, "[t]hese three areas are independent and at times inconsistent." '4 6
This Part provides a brief overview of the interrelationship between these areas
in the context of Hubert. A basic understanding of this Part provides a framework
for the discussion following it.
A. The Gross Estate
Estates of United States citizens or residents may be required to pay two kinds
of tax: estate tax47 and income tax. 4" Estate tax is an excise tax imposed upon the
transfer of a decedent's property.49 The tax base for computing estate tax is the
taxable estate,50 determined by subtracting from the gross estate certain allowable
deductions." The gross estate includes the date-of-death fair market value of all
property, "real or personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever situated," to the
extent of the decedent's interest therein. 2
642(g) Election, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 501 (1994); Farhad Aghdami & David Pratt, The
Supreme Court Decides Hubert-Now What Do We Do?, 86 J. TAX'N 340 (1997) [hereinafter
Aghdami & Pratt, The Supreme Court]; Jerald David August & James J. Freeland, S. Ct. in
Hubert Fails to Provide Needed Guidance, 24 EST. PLAN. 299 (1997); David A. Baker, The
Principle of the Thing-Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 1997,
at 38; Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Estate Tax Marital and Charitable Deductions Need Not Be
Reduced by the Amount of Expenses That Would Have Gone to a Spouse or Charity, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at B4; Francis B. Brogan, Jr. & Andrew D. Painter, Administration
Expenses May Lower Other Deductions, 21 EST. PLAN. 131 (1994); Steven C. Colbum et al.,
Administrative Expenses and the Marital Deduction, 72 TAXES 412 (1994); Charles Davenport,
A Street Through Hubert's Fog, 73 TAX NOTES 1107 (1996); Mitchell M. Gans, Will
Administration Expenses Charged to Income Reduce the Marital Deduction?, 71 J. TAX'N 90
(1989); David Pratt, Deducting Estate Administration Expenses: Does a Section 642(g)
Election Still Make Sense?, 65 TAXNOTES 1683 (1994) [hereinafter Pratt, Deducting]; George
L. Strobel II & Caroline D. Strobel, The Proper Treatment ofAdministrative Expenses: The
Debate Rages On, 26 TAx ADvIsER 228 (1995).
45. See infra Part III for a discussion of the cases leading up to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hubert.
46. Scott H. Malin & Bennett S. Keller, Planning for the Allocation of Administration
Expenses to Income Under Hubert, 84 J. TAX'N 213, 214 (1996).
47. See I.R.C. § 2001 (1994).
48. See id. § 641(a). For purposes of this Note, only tax imposed by the federal
government, and not the various state governments, is considered.
49. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (as amended in 1963).
50. See I.R.C. § 2001.
51. See id. § 2051.
52. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (as amended in 1963). The regulations define the gross estate
as the total value of the decedent's interests described in I.R.C. §§ 2033- 2044. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.203 1-l(a) (as amended in 1965). Section 2033 includes any property interest the decedent
held at the time of death; § 2034 includes dower or curtesy interests of the decedent's surviving
spouse; § 2035 includes property transferred in contemplation of death; § 2036 includes
property transferred with a retained life estate; § 2037 includes transfers taking effect at death;
§ 2038 includes revocable transfers; § 2039 includes annuities; § 2040 includes joint interests;
§ 2041 includes general power of appointment property; § 2042 includes life insurance
1998]
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Fair market value is defined as "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts."53 Income accrued on the decedent's assets as of the date of death but as yet
unpaid is included in determining fair market value,54 but post-mortem income
earned during administration of the estate is excluded." Instead, post-mortem
income is reported on the estate's income tax return." This difference results
from the concept of date-of-death valuation of the gross estate. "Brief as is the
instant of death, the court must pinpoint [the estate's] valuation at this
instant-the moment of truth, when the ownership of the decedent ends and the
ownership of the successors begins. 57
B. Deductions from the Gross Estate
Allowable deductions are subtracted from the gross estate to arrive at the
taxable estate. 58 These include deductions for amounts that will not be passed on
to any beneficiary because they were consumed during the course of
administration, 9 such as funeral expenses,6" administration expenses, 6' claims
against the estate,62 unpaid mortgages or indebtedness, 63 and theft or casualty
losses incurred during settlement of the estate.6 4 These also include deductions
for amounts transferred to certain beneficiaries as determined by Congress,
6
including transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses, 66 and transfers to a
surviving spouse. 7 The interaction of the deduction for administration expenses
and the deduction for bequests to a spouse or charity is at the heart of the dispute
in Hubert.
proceeds; § 2043 includes transfers for insufficient consideration; and § 2044 includes certain
property for which a marital deduction was previously allowed. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a).
53. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); accord United States v. Cartwright,
411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
54. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4 (1958) (explaining that the fair market value of notes
includes unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the date of death).
55. See Bowes v. United States, 593 F.2d 272,275 (7th Cir. 1979); Alston v. United States,
349 F.2d 87, 88 (5th Cir. 1965); Estate of Home v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 100, 103 (1988).
56. See I.R.C. § 641(a)(3) (1994).
57. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1962).
58. See I.R.C. § 2051 (1994).
59. See Champine, supra note 44, at 516.
60. See I.R.C. § 2053(a)(1) (1994).
61. See id. § 2053(a)(2).
62. See id. § 2053(a)(3).
63. See id. § 2053(a)(4).
64. See id. § 2054.
65. See Champine, supra note 44, at 516.
66. See I.R.C. § 2055 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
67. See id. § 2056 (1994).
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1. Administration Expenses
It takes time, sometimes years, for the executor of an estate to collect the
decedent's assets, pay any valid debts and claims against the estate, including
estate taxes, and distribute the assets as directed in the decedent's will." During
this period of time, known as administration, the estate may incur significant
expenses. These may include executors' commissions, attorneys' fees, court
costs, accountants' fees, appraisers' fees, costs of storing or maintaining the
estate's property, brokerage fees, and auctioneers' fees.69 As long as such
expenses are actually and necessarily incurred in the proper administration of the
estate, rather than for the individual benefit of the those designated to receive the
property, they are deductible from the gross estate.7" Thus, a decedent's estate
need not pay tax on dollars expended for costs of administration if such costs are
claimed as deductions on the estate tax return. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Hubert's
estate incurred approximately $2 million of administration expenses.7'
2. Transfers for Public, Charitable, or Religious Uses
The amount of all bequests and other transfers made to qualifying organizations
for public, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes is
deductible from a decedent's gross estate.72 The charitable deduction must be
reduced by the amount of any death taxes required by the terms of the will or by
state law to be paid out of the bequest,73 and it is limited to "the value of the
transferred property required to be included in the [decedent's] gross estate."' 4
68. See ABA Section of Taxation Comments on Notice 97-63 (Apr. 1, 1998), in 98 TAX
NOTES TODAY 73-34, Apr. 16, 1998, at 24, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX library, TNT file
[hereinafter ABA Section of Taxation].
The Executor has nine months after the decedent's death to file the Estate Tax
Return. In many cases, a six month extension of time to file the Estate Tax Return
is granted. Assuming the decedent's Estate Tax Return is not audited, an Estate
Tax Closing Letter may not be received for another 12 to 18 months. Given the
fact that the Executor is personally liable for the estate tax, many Executors are
unwilling to finalize the estate administration process until after the Estate Tax
Closing Letter is received. Once the Closing Letter is received, the Executor may
need to file final accountings and Tax Returns and distribute assets from the
estate. The process of finalizing the estate may take an additional six months.
Consequently, in most cases, it may take up to 36 months to conclude the
administration of an estate.
Id.
69. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (as amended in 1979).
70. See id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 17.
72. See I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1994).
73. See id. § 2055(c).
74. Id. § 2055(d).
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3. Transfers to a Surviving Spouse
The value of any interest in property which passes to the surviving spouse is
deductible from a decedent's gross estate. 7' Like the charitable deduction, the
marital deduction is limited to amounts included in determining the value of the
decedent's gross estate.76 For purposes of valuing the property interest that passes
from the decedent to the surviving spouse, the Code requires that the date-of-
death value of the marital bequest be adjusted to take into account the effect of
any death taxes payable by the surviving spouse.77 Additionally, the Code
requires that the date-of-death value of the property interest be adjusted to take
into account the amount of any mortgage or encumbrance on the property, or the
amount of any obligation imposed upon the surviving spouse in connection with
the passing of the property, "in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such
spouse of such interest were being determined."78
Congress enacted the marital deduction as part of the Revenue Act of 1948."9
Its goal was to eliminate discrimination under the estate tax system against
couples residing in common law states, as opposed to community property
states.8 0 This original marital deduction was limited to fifty percent of the
decedent's adjusted gross estate, excluding any interest in community property.8 '
In the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,2 Congress abandoned its earlier
rationale for the marital deduction and adopted the view that married couples
should be viewed as "one economic unit" for transfer tax purposes. 3 To
incorporate this new view, Congress amended the marital deduction to allow
unlimited transfers of property to a surviving spouse, 4 intending that no estate tax
be incurred upon the death of the first spouse to the extent his or her property
passes to the survivor."5
The marital deduction is not designed to provide a permanent exemption from
transfer taxes, but a deferral of tax until the death of the surviving spouse. To this
end, a prerequisite for obtaining the deduction is that property passing to the
surviving spouse must be transferred in a manner that exposes it to tax in his or
75. See id. § 2056(a). However, if the surviving spouse is not a United States citizen, the
marital deduction is allowed only if the property interest passing to the surviving spouse is in
the form of a qualified domestic trust. See id. § 2056(d).
76. See id. § 2056(a).
77. See id. § 2056(b)(4)(A).
78. Id § 2056(b)(4)(B); see also United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963) (holding that
no estate tax marital deduction allowed where widow gave up interest in community property
in order to take under husband's will, and value of property required to be given up exceeded
value of property received); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(b) (as amended in 1994).
79. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110, 117-21.
80. See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 2 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1228.
81. See Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat. at 119.
82. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
83. S. REP. No. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228.
84. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 95 Stat. at 301.
85. See S. REP.No. 97-144, at 127.
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her estate at its then current fair market value. 6 That is, the property must not be
a so-called "nondeductible terminable interest.""7 This gives effect to Congress's
desire to treat married couples as one economic unit for transfer tax purposes, so
that property needed to support the surviving spouse is not consumed by estate
taxes upon the death of the first to die."8
C. Credits Against Estate Tax
Once allowable deductions are subtracted from the gross estate to arrive at the
taxable estate, estate tax before credits is computed. The credits most often
utilized to offset estate tax are the unified credit 9 and the credit for state death
taxes.90 The unified credit allows every U.S. citizen or resident to give or
bequeath the equivalent of $625,000 free of transfer tax.9' To assure that this
86. See Pennell, supra note 20, at A-I, -7.
87. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1994). This section provides as follows:
Limitation in the case of life estate or other terminable interest.
(1) General Rule. Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event
or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest
passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be
allowed under this section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent
to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of the
interest so passing to the surviving spouse ....
Id.
88. The estate of the first spouse to die is not subject to estate tax on the value of property
consumed or disposed of during his or her lifetime. Likewise, the estate of the surviving spouse
is not subject to estate tax on the value of property consumed or disposed of during the
remainder of his or her life, whether or not it was previously subject to the estate tax marital
deduction. See Champine, supra note 44, at 575 ("By taxing couples as a unit, Congress
explicitly sanctioned the elimination from the estate tax base of assets consumed after (as well
as before) the first decedent's death, but before the surviving spouse's death.") (parenthetical
in original).
89. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1994).
90. See id. § 2011; Champine, supra note 44, at 522.
91. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 increased the effective exemption from gift and estate
tax from the $600,000 previously allowed. The increase in the effective exemption is phased
in as follows:
For Decedents Dying and Gifts Made in: Effective Exemption
1998 $625,000
1999 $650,000
2000 & 2001 $675,000
2002 & 2003 $700,000
2004 $850,000
2005 $950,000
2006 and thereafter $1,000,000




amount ultimately passes to the next generation without being subject to tax in the
estates of either the decedent or the surviving spouse, estate plans often utilize a
"credit shelter trust," the income of which is payable to the surviving spouse
during his or her life.92 Through the combined use of the unified credit and the
marital and charitable deductions, estates of any size may be able to avoid estate
tax completely.93 The issues addressed in Hubert are whether, and when, an estate
still must pay tax, even though the decedent left everything to the surviving
spouse and to charity.
D. Income Tax
Decedents' estates must pay income tax on their taxable income.94 An estate's
taxable income is generally computed in the same manner as an individual's, and
encompasses income received by the estate during the period of administration.95
Allowable deductions include trade or business expenses,96 interest expense, 97 and
expenses incurred for the production or collection of income.98
Common administration expenses deductible on the estate tax return, such as
the fees of personal representatives, attorneys, and accountants, generally also
qualify as expenses incurred for the production of income." Not surprisingly, the
law prevents the same expense from being deducted twice, once on the estate tax
return (Form 706) and once on the fiduciary income tax return (Form 1041)."° To
this effect, Congress has granted executors the option of choosing on which return
to claim the deduction.'' The option is referred to by its Internal Revenue Code
section as a 642(g) election. If an executor chooses to claim the deduction on the
fiduciary income tax return, he must file a statement with the IRS stating that this
amount has not and will not be taken at any time as a deduction for estate tax
purposes. 2 The 642(g) election is available regardless of the actual source of
92. See William P. Streng, Estate Planning, [800 Estates, Gifts, and Trusts] Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) at A-33 (1997).
93. See Champine, supra note 44, at 523.
94. See I.R.C. § 641 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
95. See id.
96. See id. § 162.
97. See id. § 163.
98. See id. § 212 (1994).
99. See Donna Litman Seiden & Nicholas E. Christin, Income Taxation of Trusts & Estates,
[852 Estates, Gifts, and Trusts] Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A-39 (1997).
100. See I.R.C. § 642(g) (Supp. I 1996).
101. See id.
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-i (1956). The regulation provides as follows:
Disallowance of double deductions; in general.
Amounts allowable under section 2053(a)(2) (relating to administration
expenses) or under section 2054 (relating to losses during administration) as
deductions in computing the taxable estate of a decedent are not allowed as
deductions in computing the taxable income of the estate unless there is filed a
statement, in duplicate, to the effect that the items have not been allowed as
deductions from the gross estate of the decedent under section 2053 or 2054 and
that all rights to have such items allowed at any time as deductions under section
2053 or 2054 are waived. The statement should be filed with the return for the
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payment of the administration expenses. 103 That is, "even if the terms of the will
or the applicable state law require" administration expenses to be paid from
principal, the executor may still choose to take the deduction on the fiduciary
income tax return.' As discussed earlier, the executors of Mr. Hubert's estate
deducted approximately $500,000 on the estate tax return as funeral and
administration expenses. They deducted the remaining $1.5 million of
administration expenses on the fiduciary income tax returns pursuant to the
election provided by 642(g).'
E. The 642(g) Election-Source of the Controversy
The 642(g) election is the source of the controversy in Hubert and the cases
preceding it. That is, if Mr. Hubert's executors had not had the choice to deduct
administration expenses on the fiduciary income tax returns, they would have had
to deduct them, if at all, on the estate tax return. Depending on the other available
deductions, this may not have decreased the estate tax liability. It would,
however, have increased the estate's taxable income, and more income tax would
have been paid. The IRS argued for this result even though the law provides
executors with the choice to take the deduction on the fiduciary income tax
return.
As Judge Learned Hand explained more than half a century ago, "[a]ny one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes."'" Accordingly, executors generally will choose to
take the deduction where it will provide the greatest tax benefit. This will vary
depending on the estate's marginal estate tax rate versus its marginal income tax
rate."° The highest marginal estate tax rate is fifty-five percent for taxable estates
over $3 million." 8 In contrast, the highest fiduciary income tax rate is 39.6% for
estates with taxable income in excess of $8350.109
year for which the items are claimed as deductions or with the district director for
the internal revenue district in which the return was filed, for association with the
return. The statement may be filed at any time before the expiration of the
statutory period of limitation applicable to the taxable year for which the
deduction is sought Allowance of a deduction in computing an estate's taxable
income is not precluded by claiming a deduction in the estate tax return, so long
as the estate tax deduction is not finally allowed and the statement is filed.
However, after a statement is filed under section 642(g) with respect to a
particular item or portion of an item, the item cannot thereafter be allowed as a
deduction for estate tax purposes since the waiver operates as a relinquishment
of the right to have the deduction allowed at any time under section 2053 or 2054.
Id
103. See Jordan, supra note 44, at 78.
104. Aghdami, Payments, supra note 44, at 718.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
106. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (citations omitted).
107. See Seiden & Christin, supra note 99, at A-39.
108. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1994).
109. See id § l(e).
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Despite the potentially higher estate tax rate, the vast majority of estates will
benefit more from making a 642(g) election and taking an income tax deduction,
assuming the estate has taxable income against which a deduction would be
useful. This would be the case for any nontaxable estate. For example, consider
the case of a decedent with a taxable estate of $625,000 or less whose unified
credit is available to reduce estate tax liability to zero. Reducing the taxable
estate below $625,000 would be a waste of the administration expense deduction
because even without the deduction the estate would pay no estate tax."'
Consider also the case of a married decedent. Typically, wills of married
individuals with large estates will provide that upon the death of the first spouse,
assets pass to a credit shelter trust to the extent of any remaining unified credit.
The balance of the estate passes to a residual trust qualifying for the unlimited
marital deduction."' Again, since no estate tax will be payable upon the death of
the first spouse, deducting administration expenses on the estate tax return would
waste the benefit of the deduction. In both of these cases, the personal
representatives likely would make a 642(g) election and deduct the costs of
administration on the fiduciary income tax returns, thereby reducing the estates'
income tax liabilities. Accordingly, even nontaxable estates are able to benefit
from the deduction for administration expenses.
Essentially, the IRS argued in Hubert that administration expenses charged to
the income of a marital or charitable bequest must be accounted for on the estate
tax return, even if they are paid from the estate's income, charged to income in
accordance with state law and the decedent's will, and deducted on the fiduciary
income tax return pursuant to the 642(g) election. The IRS approach would treat
such administration expenses as nondeductible charges, effectively decreasing the
marital or charitable deduction and creating a taxable estate where none had
existed before.
A simple example helps illustrate the Service's position. Assume a decedent
who used his unified credit during his lifetime left a $3 million estate to his wife.
Assume further that the estate incurred $200,000 in administration expenses,
which the executor charged to income in accordance with state law and the
decedent's will. The executor then elected to deduct the expenses on the fiduciary
income tax return. The IRS would calculate a taxable estate of $200,000 by
110. See generally U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Commissioner v. Estate of
Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124 (1997) (No. 95-1402) (Oral Argument, Nov. 12, 1996), available in
1996 WL 665956. Responding to a Justice's question, "Isn't the Government correct in its
reply brief in simply saying that [the 642(g)] election is always of value to the estate that
doesn't-that isn't large enough to qualify for the estate tax? ... Most estates aren't big
enough to have to worry about the estate tax anyway," the attorney for Mr. Hubert's estate
replied, "Well, to be sure, the estate taxing is imposed on a very small sliver of the American
population ..... Id. at *45-46.
111. See Strobel & Strobel, supra note 44, at 228.
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Taxable Estate $ 200,000 12
The result for the estate is even worse than it appears at first blush, because of
a spiraling "tax-on-tax" effect. Estate tax must be paid not only on the $200,000,
but also on the dollars used to pay the estate tax. As a result, the marital
deduction is further reduced, which increases the estate tax, which further reduces
the marital deduction, which increases the estate tax, and so on."' After Hubert,
it is settled that the payment of administration expenses is not per se a material
limitation on the surviving spouse's right to income, so the above result will not
be obtained in all cases. The question that remains is, "In which cases?"
III. THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT: A SPLIT AMONG
THE CIRCUITS
Familiarity with the rationale courts used in deciding cases leading up to
Hubert is helpful in understanding the Supreme Court's decision. Commentators
have described the lower courts' rationale and conclusions as "often ... complex
and inconsistent."".4 Nevertheless, there emerges a definite path leading to the
Supreme Court's decision. It begins with all courts agreeing that marital and
charitable deductions must be reduced when state law requires payment of
administration expenses from the principal of a marital or charitable bequest." 5
When state law does not so require, courts disagreed about whether the marital
and charitable deductions had to be reduced.
112. See Pratt, Deducting, supra note 44, at 1684 n.9.
113. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the American Council on Education and United
Way of America in Support of Respondent, Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124
(1997) (No. 95-1402) (noting this phenomenon).
114. Malin & Keller, supra note 46, at 213.
115. See Estate ofRoney v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960), afJ'd, 294 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1961) (reducing the residuary marital bequest deduction where Florida law required that
administration expenses be paid from the residuary); Estate of Luehrmann v. Commissioner,
33 T.C. 277 (1959), affd, 287 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1961) (reducing the residuary charitable
bequest deduction where Missouri law required that administration expenses be paid from
corpus); see also Alston v. United States, 349 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1965) (reducing the residuary
charitable bequest deduction where Georgia law required that administration expenses be paid
from the residuary when the decedent's will did not otherwise specify); Estate of Home v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 100 (1988) (reducing the residuary charitable bequest deduction be
reduced where South Carolina law required that administration expenses be charged against
principal unless otherwise provided in the decedent's will).
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A. The Sixth and Federal Circuits
When state law does not require the payment of administration expenses from
principal, the Tax Court's pre-Hubert decision, Estate of Street v.
Commissioner,"6 gave effect to the testator's expressed intention to maximize the
marital deduction by holding that administration expenses were chargeable to
income. The court accomplished this by following and expanding its earlier
decision in Estate of Richardson v. Commissioner"7 with respect to interest on
deferred estate taxes, where the court had stated, without citing authority, that
"[i]f the interest is chargeable against income, it will not reduce the value of the
interest in the estate that passes to the surviving spouse under the will, and
consequently will not reduce the amount of the marital deduction."''
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in Street with respect to
administration expenses," 9 citing the court's failure to consider the effect of
Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) on the valuation of the marital
116.56 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992).
117. 89 T.C. 1193 (1987).
118. Id at 1200. In Richardson; the decedent's will directed his executors to pay all estate
and inheritance taxes out of the portion of his residuary estate left to a family trust, and not out
of the portion left to his wife. See id. at 1194. The will was silent about interest on such taxes.
The question for the Tax Court was whether the interest payable on deferred estate and
inheritance taxes should be chargeable to principal or income. If chargeable to income, the
court stated, the interest would not reduce the net value of the property interest passing to the
surviving spouse for purposes of computing the marital deduction. See id. at 1200. The court
examined Tennessee law and concluded that there was no provision in the law that required
such interest to be charged either to principal or to income. See id. at 1202. Therefore, the court
turned to the testator's intention and found that one of his "prime intentions" was for the estate
to obtain the maximum marital deduction, which would not be possible if the interest was
chargeable to principal: Id. at 1203. The court also noted that it "seem[ed] more natural and
equitable that interest on deferred estate and inheritance taxes would be chargeable to the
income from the estate produced by assets which were not used immediately to pay the taxes."
Id. at 1202-03. Accordingly, the court held that interest on deferred estate and inheritance taxes
was chargeable to income and the marital deduction need not be reduced. See id. at 1206.
The Tax Court followed and extended its Richardson holding in Street, again applying
Tennessee law to a residuary marital bequest. The first issue in Street was identical to
Richardson, and the court found its decision in that case dispositive. See Street, 56 T.C.M. at
776. The second issue was whether administration expenses were chargeable to principal or
income. The court found it unclear whether the Tennessee Principal and Income Act, which
provided that administration expenses should be paid out of income, applied to probate estates.
Mentioning the testator's intention to maximize the marital deduction and a Tennessee statute
that required allocation of expenses to income if it would protect the marital deduction, the
court found that it was "not illogical to extend the treatment afforded interest in... Richardson
... to other administration expenses," since under Tennessee law interest on taxes was an
administration expense. Id. at 777.
119. See Street, 974 F.2d at 729. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision with respect
to interest on deferred estate taxes, and the IRS has adopted this result. See Rev. Rul. 93-48,
1993-2 C.B. 270. The Sixth Circuit distinguished interest from administration expenses
because interest "accrues sometime after death" and, unlike administration expenses, is not
expressly mentioned in Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a). Street, 974 F.2d at 729.
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deduction. 2 ' The Sixth Circuit noted that the Tax Court had not given any
consideration to the regulation, and found that the regulation "control[led] the tax
treatment of administrative expenses paid from income regardless of state law or
the dictates of a decedent's will."'' The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Commissioner that the regulation required a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the
marital deduction whenever administration expenses were charged to income, and
was "not dependent on the vagaries of state law.""l It reasoned that since income
earned during administration increases the residue, failure to decrease the marital
deduction for expenses paid from income would result in a marital deduction in
excess of the amount available for distribution.' It failed to recognize that post-
mortem income does not increase the marital deduction in the first place. The
court also found support for its position in the legislative history of the marital
deduction, implicitly equating administration expenses with claims against the
estate.'24 If the Tax Court had failed to consider Treasury Regulation section
20.2056(b)-4(a), the Sixth Circuit had failed to consider one of its most important
words: the regulation requires only material limitations on a spouse's right to
income to be taken into account.
25
The Court of Federal Claims followed the Sixth Circuit's Street decision in
Fisher v. United States. 26 In that case, the court held that the marital deduction
must be reduced by the amount of administration expenses paid out of estate
income and deducted on the fiduciary income tax return regardless of Washington
state law. 27 The Federal Circuit likewise followed the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit's Street decision in Burke v. United States.12 The Federal Circuit held
that "as a matter of federal law" the estate tax charitable deduction must be
reduced to account for the payment of administration expenses from post-mortem
income, 129 "because, for purposes of federal estate taxation, the gross estate [was]
120. See Street, 974 F.2d at 727.
121. l at 728. The court followed Estate ofRoney v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1961), which it thought could not "be distinguished from the
instant case simply because Tennessee, unlike Florida, does not have a statute which requires
administrative expenses to be paid from principal." Street, 974 F.2d at 728. See supra note 115
for a discussion of Roney.
122. Street, 974 F.2d at 729.
123. See id. at 727.
124. See id. at 728. The Sixth Circuit quoted the following portion of the Senate Report:
"the interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such
interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent leaves the residue of his estate
to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims
against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is
acquired by purchase and not bequest. Accordingly, the value of any additional
part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the
amount for the marital deduction."
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 6 (1948)).
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (as amended in 1994). See also supra note 8 for a
reproduction of the regulation.
126. 28 Fed. Cl. 88 (1993).
127. See id. at 93-94.
128. 994 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 1584.
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obligated to pay those expenses."'30 The court commented that the lower court's
emphasis on the allowable source of payment under Florida law "shift[ed] the
focus ,of the case from the pertinent question."''
B. The Eleventh Circuit
After its decision in Street was reversed by the Sixth Circuit, the Tax Court
again addressed the issue of administration expenses charged to income in Estate
of Hubert v. Commissioner.' In a decision reviewed by the court, fifteen of
seventeen judges participating in the decision chose to follow the court's earlier
decision in Richardson.. rather than following the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Street."' The Tax Court reaffirmed the role of state law in determining federal
estate tax liability. It held that Georgia law permitted the allocation of
administration expenses to income earned on the marital and charitable bequests
if the decedent's will so provided, and that to the extent the executors exercised
their discretion in so allocating administration expenses, the marital and
charitable deductions need not be reduced.'
The court, in an opinion written by Judge Clapp, disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit that Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) mandated a setoff
against the marital deduction. Instead, it interpreted the regulation as "merely a
valuation provision" that required material limitations on the spouse's right to
receive income to be taken into account when valuing the property interest for
purposes of the marital deduction.'36 Rejecting the IRS's position, the court stated
that "[tihe fact that income from property is to be used to pay expenses during the
administration of the estate is not necessarily a material limitation on the right to
receive income," and that on the facts before it, there was no material limitation
on Mrs. Hubert's right to receive income.' 37
To reach this conclusion, the court focused on the phrase in the regulation that
calls for application of the same principles "as if the amount of a gift to the
spouse were being determined."' The court looked to gift tax provisions in
I.R.C. § 2523(e) and the regulations thereunder, and Revenue Ruling 69-5639
which interprets them. 4 ' The Code provides that a spouse must be entitled to all
130. Id. at 1582.
131. Id. at 1580.
132. 101 T.C. 314 (1993), aff'd, 63 F.3d 1083 (1lth Cir. 1995), afrd, 117 S. Ct. 1124
(1997). See supra text accompanying notes 13-28 for a discussion of the facts of Hubert.
133. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 329. See also supra note 118 for a discussion of Richardson.
134. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 328.
135. See id. at 324.
136. Id. at 324-25.
137. Id. at 325. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Beghe
disagreed. In his view, the marital and charitable income interests were "substantially burdened
and materially limited." He disagreed with the IRS's dollar-for-dollar reduction, however, and
favored a present value approach. Id. at 348-49.
138. Id. at 324 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (as amended in 1994)). See also supra
note 8 for a reproduction of the regulation.
139. 1969-1 C.B. 224.
140. See Hubert, 101 T.C. at 325.
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of the income from a GPA trust in order for the donor of the gift in trust to be
entitled to a gift tax deduction.' Under Treasury Regulation section 25.2523(e)-
l(f)(3), the spouse is considered to receive all of the income from the trust even
if "trustees' commissions and other charges" are paid from such income, as long
as the spouse is not deprived of "substantial beneficial enjoyment" of the trust
property during his or her life.'42 In Revenue Ruling 69-56, the IRS determined
that conferring administrative powers on fiduciaries to charge executors' fees,
legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and other administration expenses to
income or to principal does not result in the "disallowance or diminution" of the
marital deduction for estate or gift tax purposes.'4 3 The Tax Court likened the
powers conferred in Hubert to those discussed in the Revenue Ruling.'" Further,
the court determined that "the income used to pay administration expenses [was]
insubstantial compared to the lifetime of income Mrs. Hubert [would] receive
from the property,"' 45 and therefore she was not deprived of substantial beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Accordingly, the court concluded that under the gift
tax regulations she would be treated as having received all of the income, and
therefore there could be no material limitation on her right to receive income.
4 6
The Tax Court took issue with the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the effect of post-
mortem income on the marital deduction, pointing out that income earned on
estate property does not increase the marital deduction, so no corresponding
decrease for expenses paid from such income is required. 47 The court
distinguished between administration expenses and claims against the estate and
therefore found that the legislative history of the marital deduction, cited by the
Sixth Circuit, did not control. 141 The court also rejected the distinctions made by
the Sixth Circuit between interest and administration expenses.' 49 As for Estate
141. See I.R.C. § 2523(e) (1994).
142. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-l(f)(3) (as amended in 1994). This section is identical to
estate tax regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3).
143. 1969-1 C.B. 224, 225.
144. In countless cases, the Tax Court has explained that Revenue Rulings do not have the
force of law, but represent the views of the IRS National Office and are "merely statements of
the Commissioner's litigating and administrative position." Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. 13, 46 (1995). They do not "constitute authority for deciding a case in [the Tax]
Court." Neuhoffv. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 36, 46 (1980), affd, 669 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
If Revenue Rulings merely represent a litigation strategy that the IRS will not be held to, then
as a matter of sound policy they should not even be brought up. For a discussion of the
difference between Revenue Rulings and Treasury Regulations, see Judge Hall's concurring
opinion in Browne v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 723, 731 (1980).
145. Hubert, 101 T.C. at 325.
146. See id. at 325-26.
147. See id at 329. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Halpern
disagreed. In his view, both principal and anticipated future income are included in the date-of-
death value of the gross estate at their combined discounted present value. While Judge
Halpem argued that "the majority is undone by its view that income earned on estate property
is not included in the gross estate," he admitted in a footnote that "[i]t is true, of course, that
income actually earned on such property during the period of estate administration is not
included in the gross estate." Id at 342-43, 351 n.5 (emphasis omitted).
148. See id. at 326.
149. See id. at 329.
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ofRoney v. Commissioner,5 ' which the Sixth Circuit had followed, the Tax Court
found it was not inconsistent with its resfilt in Hubert, since in Roney it had
"merely held... that when administration expenses are required to be allocated
to principal, the marital deduction is reduced by the amount of those expenses."''
A two-to-one panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision
in Hubert, holding that the marital and charitable deductions should not be
reduced by the amount of administration expenses allocated to income.'
15 2
Agreeing with the "careful analysis" and reasoning set forth by the Tax Court, the
court of appeals attached the lower court's opinion as an appendix to its own and
adopted it completely.'53 The court expressly recognized that its holding brought
it "in conflict with two other circuits which have decided the issue," citing the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Street and the Federal Circuit's decision in Burke.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN HUBERT
The question presented is simple and its answer should have been equally
straightforward. Yet we are confronted with a maze of regulations and rulings
that lead at times in opposite directions. There is no reason why this labyrinth
should exist, especially when the Commissioner is empowered to promulgate
new regulations and make the answer clear. 55
When the Supreme Court granted the Commissioner's petition for writ of
certiorari in Hubert,'56 practitioners and the public hoped that the Court would go
beyond deciding the case at hand and resolve the underlying issues. 1 7 That
proved to be too much to hope for, given the lack of guidance in the Code and
regulations for determining when a material limitation on a spouse's right to
income exists. In fact, the Court produced four opinions, with none supported by
a majority of the Justices. Justice Kennedy wrote for the plurality and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg; Justice O'Connor
wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Thomas;
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Breyer;
150. 33 T.C. 801 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1961).
151. Hubert, 101 T.C. at330 (emphasis added). Seesupra text accompanying notes 115 and
121 for a discussion of Roney.
152. See Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 1083, 1083 (1 1th Cir. 1995), affd, 117
S. Ct. 1124 (1997). One of the two affirming judges was Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Seventh Circuit, Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach, sitting by designation. See id
153. Id. at 1083-84.
154. Id. at 1083.
155. Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124, 1139 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
156. Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 517 U.S. 1166 (1996).
157. See, e.g., August & Freeland, supra note 44, at 299 ("[]t was hoped that the decision
would provide a 'bright-line' test for planning purposes."); Justices to Resolve Estate Tax
Dispute: The IRS Contends that a Marietta Man's Estate Still Owes $154,000, ATLANTA J. &
CoNsT., Apr. 30, 1996, at A5 ("The Supreme Court agreed Monday to resolve an arcane but
big-money dispute over estate taxes that government lawyers say arises 'in countless cases.').
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Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion. 8 Despite writing four opinions,
a majority of Justices were able to agree on a few issues.
A. Payment ofAdministration Expenses from Income Is
Not Per Se a Material Limitation
First, as discussed earlier, seven Justices rejected the Service's argument that
the marital deduction must be reduced any time administration expenses are
charged to income from the marital bequest.'59 That is, they rejected the notion
that any use of income to pay administration expenses is per se a material
limitation on a surviving spouse's right to income. Since the IRS did not prove,
or even argue, that the specific amount of expense charged to income in Hubert
was a material limitation, the Justices agreed that there was no basis to reverse the
Tax Court's decision that it was not.
60
The plurality reached this conclusion after breaking new ground in the field of
estate tax valuation. Before beginning his analysis, Justice Kennedy noted that
both parties agreed that the marital and charitable deduction statutes should be
read to require the same treatment, and that the Court adopted this approach. He
explained that because the marital deduction statute and regulations "speak in
more specific terms" about valuation, the Court's analysis would focus on those,
but its holding would apply to both deductions.16 ' Justice Kennedy then
immediately proposed a new valuation theory for the marital deduction, one not
advanced by either party, the Tax Court, any of the amici, or any previous court
to have considered the issue. 62 He looked to gift tax regulations that deal with
valuing the marital deduction when a spouse is given the remainder interest in a
split-interest trust.163 There, the allowable deduction is the present value of the
remainder interest."6 After acknowledging that those regulations did not control
the present situation, Justice Kennedy wrote that it was "natural... to apply the
present-value principle to the question at hand."'65 His analysis therefore began
by concluding that if it was determined that there existed a material limitation on
Mrs. Hubert's right to income, then the marital deduction should be valued by
subtracting from the value of the bequest an amount equal to the present value,
as of the date of death, of the income expected to be used to pay administration
expenses. 6
6
Justice Kenntedy rejected the Commissioner's per se materiality and dollar-for-
dollar reduction arguments and agreed with the Tax Court that Regulation section
20.2056(b)-4(a), relied upon by the IRS, was "'merely a valuation provision.""'' 67
158. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1127, 1134, 1139, 1146.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
160. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1132, 1138.
161. Id at 1129.
162. See id. at 1144 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 1129.
164. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(a)-l(e) (as amended in 1994).
165. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1129.
166. See id. at 1129.
167. Id at 1131 (quoting Estate of Hubertv. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314, 324-25 (1993)).
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He concurred with the lower court's assessment that the fact that income is used
to pay administration expenses is "not necessarily a material limitation" on the
surviving spouse's right to income. 6
Justice Kennedy then looked to Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9), which
discusses the "right to income" requirement of marital power of appointment
trusts. The regulation states that where an executor is authorized to delay the
distribution of the decedent's assets beyond a reasonable period of
administration, and where the spouse is not entitled to the income from the assets
before distribution, the interest may not meet the "right to income" requirement
and may not qualify for the marital deduction. The regulation then refers the
reader to section 20.2056(b)-4(a) for valuation of the spouse's property interest
"where the right to income is expressly postponed."' 169 Justice Kennedy found that
Mrs. Hubert's property interest did not fit this situation. 7 °
He then proposed situations where payment of administration expenses from
income might be deemed a material limitation on a surviving spouse's right to
income. For example, a material limitation might exist where an estate's
anticipated administration expenses are "material" as compared with the
anticipated income, such as where the corpus of the marital bequest is small or the
assets do not produce much income. 7' Justice Kennedy did not define "material"
however. He then suggested that using income from bequests in trust is more
likely to constitute a material limitation on a spouse's right to income than is
using income from outright bequests. Justice Kennedy did not apply that rationale
to Mrs. Hubert's situation, he explained, because the full value, equivalent to a
fee interest, of the GPA and QTIP trusts will be includable in her estate.'72 Such
is always the case with marital deduction GPA and QTIP trusts. Finally, in
keeping with the new "projected present value" theory of valuation, Justice
Kennedy concluded that although the Tax Court did not elaborate, it might have
thought the anticipated expenses of the estate were immaterial compared to its
expected future income.'74
In the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor first looked to -the Internal
Revenue Code and found no guidance. She found it impossible to tell from
§ 2056(b)(4)(B) whether payment of administration expenses from income should
reduce the marital deduction "always, sometimes, or not at all."'7 5 She next turned
to the legislative history and agreed with the Tax Court that it was not helpful
because it addressed claims against the estate and not administration expenses.176
Turning to Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a), Justice O'Connor first focused,
as had the Tax Court, on the phrase requiring valuation as if"a gift to the spouse"
168. Id.
169. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) (as amended in 1994).
170. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1131.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1132.
173. See Aghdami & Pratt, The Supreme Court, supra note 44, at 344-45.
174. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1132.
175. Id. at 1135 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. See id.
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had been made.' After rejecting the plurality's reliance on remainder interest
valuation regulations for its new valuation theory, she discussed the Tax Court's
reliance on Regulation sections 25.2523(e)-l(f)(3) and (4) and Revenue Ruling
69-56. 7" Although Justice O'Connor found that these provisions favored Mr.
Hubert's estate, she found the result not "wholly satisfying," and she
acknowledged that both the plurality and dissenting opinions criticized the Tax
Court's approach.
79
Finally, Justice O'Connor determined that the case hinged on the meaning of
"material." Rather than debate about the dictionary definition of the word, she
concluded that the Commissioner had already interpreted it in Revenue Ruling
93-48." ° In that ruling, the Service adopted the decisions of the Tax Court in
Richardson' and the Sixth Circuit in Street' with respect to interest on deferred
estate taxes. The ruling provides that post-mortem interest accruing on deferred
federal estate tax payable from marital and charitable bequests will not
"ordinarily" reduce the date-of-death value of the bequests for purposes of the
marital and charitable deductions.1
3
Justice O'Connor made the preliminary point that, in her view, interest on
deferred estate taxes and other types of administration expenses should be treated
the same under Regulation section 20-2056(b)-4(a). She supported this view with
observations that neither expense exists at the date of death, but both "are
inevitable once the estate is open," and both are uncertain in amount at the date
of death.'84
More importantly, however, Justice O'Connor found that by issuing Revenue
Ruling 93-48, the Commissioner had rejected "the notion that every financial
burden on a marital bequest's postmortem income is a material limitation"
requiring the marital deduction to be reduced.' Instead, Justice O'Connor found,
the Commissioner had created a test of quantitative materiality.' 6 That said, the
Commissioner had yet to determine when the "threshold of materiality" is
crossed. In the absence of any guidance, the Tax Court's approach was as
consistent with the law as any other.
8 7
Finally, Justice O'Connor shared the dissents' reluctance to find the $1.5
million charge to income in Hubert immaterial under any standard. 8 However,
because the Commissioner had argued for an all-or-nothing rule and had never
argued that the specific amount of expense in Hubert was material, Justice
177. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (as amended in 1994). See also supra note 8 for a
reproduction of the regulation.
178. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1136.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 1137.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18 for a discussion of Richardson.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25 for a discussion of Street.
183. Rev. Reg. 93-48, 1993-2 C.B. 270.
184. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1137.
185. Id. (emphasis omitted).
186. See id. at 1138; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
187. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1138.
188. See id.
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O'Connor declined to save the Commissioner from the result of her litigation
strategy, despite the "seemingly counterintuitive result" reached in the case.8 9
B. Structural Problems Exist in the Tax Court's Analysis
The second point capturing majority concurrence dealt with the Tax Court's
analysis of Hubert. Although the Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, six
Justices rejected the approach the Tax Court used to conclude that under the
regulations there could be no material limitation on Mrs. Hubert's right to
income. The Tax Court, as previously explained, had relied on gift tax regulations
and an IRS Revenue Ruling in determining that because Mrs. Hubert was not
deprived of substantial beneficial enjoyment of the trust property, she would be
treated as having received all of the income for gift tax purposes, and hence'there
could be no material limitation on her right to receive income. 90
The plurality identified a "structural problem" with the Tax Court's
approach,' 9 ' and Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Breyer) concurred.' 92 The
language of gift tax regulation sections 25.2523(e)- I(f)(3) and (4) is identical to
the language of estate tax regulation sections 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3) and (4). All of
these sections relate to the "right to income" requirement of marital power of
appointment trusts, defining when a spouse will be considered to have received
all of the income from the trust in order to qualify the gift or bequest for the
marital deduction.
93
The problem identified by the plurality in reading the language of Regulation
section 20.2056(b)-4(a) as invoking the gift tax provisions for valuation purposes
is that those provisions relate to the qualification of an interest for the marital
deduction, not the valuation of an admittedly already qualified interest. Because
the language of the gift tax sections is identical to the language of the estate tax
qualification sections, any analysis called for by the gift tax provisions at the
valuation stage would necessarily already have been completed at the earlier,
estate tax deduction qualification stage. Therefore, any interest that failed the
earlier qualification stage would not need to be valued. Any interest that passed
the earlier qualification stage, that is, any interest that was considered to provide
the spouse with all of the income from the property, would never be reduced at
the valuation stage. Such a reading of regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) renders
its valuation step superfluous. 94
189. Id. at 1139.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 136-46.
191. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1130.
192. See id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.).
193. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2523(e)-I(f)(3) to (f)(4), 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3) to (f)(4) (as amended in
1994).
194. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1130.
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C. The Plurality Relied on an Irrelevant Regulation
The third point that a majority of Justices agreed to in Hubert was to reject as
irrelevant the regulation relied upon by the plurality in formulating its projected
present value theory of valuation. Justice O'Connor noted that the plurality itself
admitted that the regulation was not on point, but nevertheless used it to derive
a marital deduction valuation theory focused solely on anticipated income and
anticipated administration expenses as of the decedent's date of death.'9 s To
Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Souter and Thomas), because the regulation
did no more that suggest a theory with questionable value in the context of the
case, it provided no meaningful guidance.' 96 Justice Scalia (joined by Justice
Breyer) agreed. "[T]he regulation has no relevance. Like its counterparts in the
estate tax provisions,... it simply provides instruction on how to value the assets
comprising the gift. It says nothing about how to take account of administration
expenses. ' '
D. $1.5 Million Might Be Material Under Any Standard
Fourth, a majority of Justices were apparently willing to find that $1.5 million
was quantitatively material. Had the Commissioner argued this, she may have
prevailed in Hubert. Justice O'Connor made clear her position that if the Court
were considering the question of quantitative materiality de novo, she would have
been "hard pressed not to find [that] amount 'material' given the size of Mr.
Hubert's estate."' 98 She didn't elaborate further, but apparently concluded that the
"threshold of materiality" is crossed somewhere before expenses equal to five
percent of the value of the gross estate are charged to the income of the marital
and charitable bequests. Again, she was joined by Justices Souter and Thomas.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Breyer) agreed with the IRS that any diversion
of income from the marital and charitable bequests was material.' 99
195. See id. at 1135-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. See id. at 1136 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter and Thomas, J.J.).
197. Id. at 1140 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
198. Id at 1138 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. See id at 1139 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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V. WHEN DOES A MATERIAL LIMITATION EXIST, AND How
SHOULD IT BE VALUED?
Because the Hubert Court rejected the Service's argument for a standard of per
se materiality, but could not agree on what the standard should be, we are
currently left with the state of affairs described by Justice Scalia in his dissenting
opinion. He urged deference to the Service's interpretation, because to read
"material" as meaning anything other than "relevant or consequential" to the
value of the spouse's property interest would be to
leave it to the taxpayer, the Commissioner, and ultimately the courts, to guess
whether a particular decrease in value is "material" enough to
qualify-without any hint as to what might be a "ballpark" figure, or indeed
any hint as to whether there is such a thing as "absolute materiality" (the two
million dollars at issue here, for instance) or whether it is all relative to the
size of the estate.
200
The most important result of the decision for practitioners is that the IRS and
Treasury Department have taken Justice O'Connor up on her invitation20 ' to
promulgate regulations that will fill this void and provide taxpayers and
practitioners with much-needed guidance. 2 2 The issues that must be addressed by
the regulations are first, what constitutes a "material" limitation on a surviving
spouse's right to income from property, and second, if a material limitation exists,
how is it taken into account in valuing the estate tax marital deduction. Numerous
200. Id. at 1142 (parenthetical in original).
201. See supra text accompanying note 155.
202. See I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
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theories have been advanced by the courts," 3 the IRS, and commentators to
answer these questions.
A. The Service's Proposed Alternatives
In Notice 97-63, the IRS solicited public comment on three alternatives for
proposed regulations. The proposed regulations would amend Treasury
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) by providing guidance on when there exists
a material limitation on a surviving spouse's right to income for purposes of
valuing the marital deduction.2 ' Under the first approach (the "Federal Method")
the Service would distinguish between expenses that are "properly charged to
principal" and those that are "properly charged to income" for purposes of
regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a). °5 The designation of an expense as one or the
203. The opinions of the courts that considered Hubert offer little helpful guidance on these
issues. In addressing the first question, the Tax Court majority in Hubert compared the actual
income used to pay administration expenses to the projected lifetime income Mrs. Hubert
would receive from the property and determined that the former was "insubstantial" in
comparison. Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314,325 (1993), arid, 63 F.3d 1083
(I lth Cir. 1995), aftd, 117 S. Ct 1124 (1997). The majority did not explain how it determined
the amount of income Mrs. Hubert would receive from the property during her lifetime, nor did
it explain at what point the percentage of income used to pay expenses would cross the line
from "insubstantial" to substantial or material. Because it concluded that no material limitation
existed, the majority did not address the second issue of how such a limitation would affect the
value of the marital deduction.
Like the Tax Court majority, the Supreme Court plurality never defined the point at which
materiality would be reached. Although it did not determine that there existed a material
limitation on Mrs. Hubert's right to income, the plurality nevertheless advanced a new theory
for taking such a limitation into account. As discussed previously, Justice Kennedy suggested
that if a material limitation is determined to exist, then the marital deduction should be valued
by subtracting from the value of the bequest an amount equal to the present value, as of the date
of death, of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. See supra text
accompanying notes 160-68.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia explained why the plurality's theory should be
rejected. It could "createl] taxable estates where none exist" because of its focus on anticipated,
rather than actual, administration expenses. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1146 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
He proposed the following example loosely based on the facts of Hubert: A decedent left $30
million in trust to his wife. The executor anticipated a will contest and projected, as of the date
of death, that the estate would incur $5 million in administration expenses. The executor
determined that that amount was material and (ignoring the plurality's present-value step)
reduced the marital deduction from $30 million to $25 million. To everyone's delight, the
family members settled their differences and no will contest was filed after all. The estate
closed quickly with virtually no administration expenses. Alas, under the plurality's approach,
the marital deduction is based on estimates that ignore facts occurring after the date of death,
while the regulations require deductible administration expenses to be "actually and necessarily
incurred." Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (as amended in 1979). The executor is left to explain
why there is a taxable estate of $5 million subject to the fifty-five percent marginal rate when
the decedent left everything to his wife. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1145-56. Justice Scalia's
argument against the plurality's projected present value approach is convincing.
204. See I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
205. Id.
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other would be determinative for federal estate tax purposes, regardless of the
dictates of applicable local law or the governing instrument. If income were used
to pay an expense that is properly charged to principal, there would exist a
material limitation on the surviving spouse's right to income, and the marital
deduction would be reduced dollar for dollar by the amount of the income so
used.206
According to the IRS, expenses that are properly charged to income would
include expenses incurred in the production or collection of income,20 7 such as
current income taxes. °8 Expenses that are properly charged to principal would
include "commonly incurred" administration expenses such as attorneys' fees,
appraisers' fees, brokers' commissions, and estate and inheritance taxes.2 9 Notice
97-63 states that this approach attempts to follow "reasonable estate
administration practices" and would generally be easy to apply.2 0
The Service's second proposal (the "Safe Harbor Method") would allow a de
minimis safe harbor amount of income to be used to pay administration expenses
without constituting a material limitation on the surviving spouse's right to
income. The safe harbor would be based on a percentage of the estate's gross
income during the period of administration, or a specified dollar amount, or some
combination of the two. If more than the safe harbor amount of income were used
to pay administration expenses, a material limitation would exist and the marital
deduction would be reduced dollar for dollar by such excess. Notice 97-63
recognizes that a safe harbor amount based on a percentage of the estate's income
would have to be recomputed yearly, and therefore would be more difficult to
apply than one based on a specified dollar amount.
21
Under the third approach (the "Per Se Method") the regulation would be
amended to state that any use of income to pay administration expenses
constitutes a material limitation on the surviving spouse's right to income.
21 2
B. Practitioners' Comments
The IRS received a dozen letters in response to its request for comments. For
the most part the comments are very thoughtful, analytically sound, and offer
viable solutions to the Hubert problem. However, two of them warrant little
discussion because they miss the point entirely.2"3 Of the remaining comments,
206. See id.
207. See I.R.C. § 212 (1994).





213. An Alabama attorney urges the Service, "in the interest of simplicity ... [and to
prevent] the estate tax law [from] becom[ing] as complicated as the income tax law," to permit
administration expenses to be "paid out of either income or principal without adversely
affecting either the marital deduction or the charitable deduction." Letter from Harold I.
Apolinsky, Sirote & Permutt, to Internal Revenue Service (Nov. 13, 1997), in 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 10-13, Jan. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File. While the
Treasury Department should provide guidance that can be easily understood and applied, it will
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three would adopt some variation of the Federal Method,214 six favor a Safe
Harbor Method,21 and one recommends a largely modified version of the Per Se
Method.216
The comments also may be divided into two fundamental theoretical camps:
those that would throw out the materiality question and rewrite Treasury
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) on a clean slate, and those that would amend
the existing regulation to answer the question of when a material limitation exists.
Letters advocating the former approach were written by Professor Joseph M.
Dodge of the University of Texas School of Law and by the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section. 17
1. The Federal Method
Several commentators express concern about the Federal Method, in which the
IRS's distinction between expenses that are "properly charged to principal" and
those that are "properly charged to income" would be determinative for federal
estate tax purposes regardless of local law or the provisions of a decedent's
will.218 The commentators point out theoretical and practical problems with the
Federal Method.
not write a regulation that allows unlimited administration expenses to be charged to the
income of a marital bequest without affecting the valuation of the marital deduction. Similarly,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") proposes that administration
expenses that are payable out of income under the governing instrument and applicable state
law should not reduce the otherwise allowable marital or charitable deductions, but that such
expenses should be deductible on the fiduciary income tax returns only to the extent of net
income during estate administration, excluding capital gains. The AICPA urges the Service to
adopt its "simple, understandable, fair, and practical" approach, noting that because "the
Supreme Court has already ruled that administration expenses payable out of income do not
reduce the charitable deduction and marital deduction," its proposal "would not provide the
taxpayer any greater benefit in that area than provided under current law." Letter from Michael
E. Mares, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, AICPA to Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 29, 1998), in 98 TAXNOTS TODAY 29-59, Feb. 12, 1998,
available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File. The AICPA states too broadly the Supreme
Court's decision in Hubert and entirely misses the question of what constitutes a material
limitation. Its proposal would extend the holding in Hubert such that the use of income to pay
administration expenses would never constitute a material limitation on a surviving spouse's
right to income for purposes of valuing the marital deduction. Again, the Treasury Department
is not going to write such a regulation.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 230-41.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 259-70.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 252-57.
217. See Letter from Joseph M. Dodge, University of Texas School of Law to Internal
Revenue Service (Feb. 2, 1998), in 98 TAXNOTES TODAY 54-35, Mar. 20, 1998, available in
LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File [hereinafter Dodge]; New York State Bar Association Tax
Section, Impact of Administrative Expenses on Amount of Estate Tax Deduction for Charitable
and Marital Bequests, in 98 TAx NOTES TODAY 127-19, July 2, 1998, available in LEXIS,.
FEDTAX Library, TNT File [hereinafter NYSBA].
218. I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
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First, the Federal Method does not attempt to answer the question of
materiality, but instead erects an "absolute rule of classification." '219 It focuses on
the nature of particular expenses, rather than on the level of expenses relative to
post-mortem income.22 Further, its uniform federal standard would contravene
the long-established principal and income laws of most states." The
constitutional questions that might be raised as a result of overriding state law
have not been adequately examined or debated.222
Moreover, the Federal Method does not reflect reasonable estate administration
practices,'m and would add undue complications to the administration process?
2 4
Fiduciaries already have potentially conflicting duties to both the income and
remainder beneficiaries of estates and trusts, and must balance the effects of
certain tax elections between them. 5 New federal standards governing which
expenses are "properly charged to principal" and which are "properly charged to
income" would add further burdens to the fiduciaries' obligations."' Rather than
providing a solution to the Hubert problem that is easy to administer, the Federal
Method would complicate matters by creating disparities between federal tax
accounting law and state fiduciary accounting law.227 It would also run contrary
to Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4), which allows marital power
of appointment ("POA") trust instruments to grant trustees the administrative
power to "determine the allocation or apportionment of receipts and
disbursements between income and corpus" without disqualifying the interest in
trust for the marital deduction:22 As a practical concern, the many thousands of
wills that presently grant executors discretion in allocating administration
expenses may have to be rewritten if the Federal Method is adopted. 29
Even the three comment letters that favor the Federal Method modify it. Two
of these recommend looking to the default provisions of the applicable state's
principal and income laws to determine what level of expenses are properly
219. ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 19.
220. See Frank G. Colella, Comments on Notice 97-63 (Jan. 30, 1998), in 98 TAX NOTS
TODAY 93-24, May 14, 1998, 22, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File
[hereinafter Colella].
221. See ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 13.
222. See Colella, supra note 220, 24.
223. See ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 13.
224. See Comments of Individual Members of the American Bar Association's Section of
Real Property Probate and Trust Law Concerning Notice 97-63, 1997-47 IRB 6 Relating to
What Constitutes a Mateiial Limitation on a Surviving Spouse's Right to Income, in 98 TAX
NOTES TODAY 127-12, July 2, 1998, 19, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File
[hereinafter ABA Section of Real Property].
225. See id. 8, 19.
226. See id. 19.
227. See ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 15.
228. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (as amended in 1994); see also ABA Section of
Taxation, supra note 68, 14.
229. See ABA Section of Real Property, supra note 224, 19.
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charged to principal and to income, rather than creating a new federal standard."
For example, if a state's default rule would charge all administration expenses to
principal unless otherwise provided in a decedent's will, and a decedent's will
gives the executor the discretion to allocate the expenses to principal or to
income, the marital deduction would have to be reduced to the extent that
expenses were charged to income in accordance with that discretion.23" ' By the
same token, expenses charged to income in accordance with the state's default
rule would never constitute a material limitation on a surviving spouse's right to
income. 2 In addition to eliminating some of the concerns about a new uniform
federal law discussed previously, the proponents of this approach note that it has
the advantage of looking to state laws that "are based upon the economic interests
of income and remainder beneficiaries and [that] have significance that is
independent of the tax law." 3 Because of their independent significance, there
is little risk that the states' principal and income laws would be modified for tax
purposes. 4
The third commentator favoring the Federal Method, the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section ("NYSBA"), advocates writing the proposed regulations
on a clean slate, without relying "on local law distinctions between principal and
income and on an undefined concept of materiality."2 5 The NYSBA would
modify the Service's approach in three ways. First, it would not identify expenses
as "properly charged to principal" or "properly charged to income." ' Instead,
it would classify expenses as either "estate transmission expenses" or "estate
investment expenses." 2" The former would include expenses incurred in
connection with collecting the estate's assets, paying debts and taxes, and
distributing the assets, and would always reduce the marital or charitable
deduction. The latter would include expenses incurred in connection with
investing, preserving, and maintaining the estate's assets during the period of
230. See Letter from Chair, Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation, Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, to Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 24, 1998), in 98 TAX NOTES TODAY
54-36, Mar. 20, 1998, 7, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File [hereinafter
Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation ]; Tax Section of the Florida Bar Comments on Notice
97-63 (Feb. 2, 1998), in 98 TAxNOTES TODAY 29-60, Feb. 12, 1998, 8, available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File [hereinafter Fla. Bar].
231. See Fla. Bar, supra note 230, 29. The only variation to this general rule that the Tax
Section of the Florida Bar suggests is that expenses incurred in connection with an audit,
including litigation and appeals, that are charged to income in accordance with the governing
instrument, should not reduce the marital or charitable deductions even if such expenses exceed
the state's default amount. This exception is needed so that an IRS challenge to an estate tax
return will not cause an increase in estate tax simply because of the professional fees incurred
in defending the estate's position. See id. 38.
232. See id. 29.
233. Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation, supra note 230, 17.
234. See id.
235. NYSBA, supra note 217, 27.
236. I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
237. NYSBA, supra note 217, 30-32.
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administration, and would never reduce the marital or charitable deduction."8 The
theory behind this distinction is that
[e]xpenses that are not incurred in connection with the effort to produce a
post-death investment return, diminish the value of the property passing to
the estate's beneficiaries; expenses that are incurred in connection with the
effort to produce such income, are intended to enhance the estate's value and
should not reduce the value of such property for estate tax purposes."'
Second, the NYSBA would eliminate the concept of a "material limitation on
a spouse's right to income" from Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a)
and would instead move it to the regulations that address whether bequests in the
form of POA and QTIP trusts qualify for the marital deduction.24 Finally, the
NYSBA would make clear that "estate investment expenses" do not reduce the
marital or charitable deductions even if they are properly charged to principal
under local law.24'
Even with their proposed modifications, the approaches^ of these three
commentators still suffer from many of the same ills as the Federal Method. They
erect classification schemes for administration expenses in contravention of state
principal and income laws, rather than addressing what level of administration
expenses charged to the income of a marital bequest would be material. For the
foregoing reasons, the Federal Method and all of its variations should be rejected.
2. The Per Se Method
It is not surprising that the Service included an alternative in Notice 97-63 that
would administratively overrule Hubert, since Justice O'Connor declared in the
concurring opinion that "nothing prevents the Commissioner from announcing by
regulation the very position she advances in this litigation." '242 However, this
alternative is clearly not favored by the practitioners who submitted comments to
the IRS, for good reason.
Despite Justice O'Connor's comment, nothing in the Internal Revenue Code
requires the value of the marital or charitable deduction to be reduced when a
642(g) election is made. Section 642(g) simply prevents certain expenses, such
as administration expenses, from being claimed as deductions twice, once on the
estate tax return and again on the fiduciary income tax return. It makes absolutely
no mention of the marital and charitable deductions.243
Further, the controlling marital deduction Code provision, § 2056, does not
even mention administration expenses. It speaks in terms of "mortgages,"
"encumbrances," and "obligations. 244 As Justice O'Connor herself noted, it is
impossible to tell from the Code whether payment of administration expenses





242. Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124, 1139 (1997).
243. I.R.C. § 642(g) (Supp. 111996).
244. Id. at § 2056(b)(4)(B) (1994).
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all."24 The legislative history likewise provides no guidance about what effect
administration expenses should have on the value of the marital deduction.246
Despite this lack of guidance in the Code and legislative history, Treasury
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) requires material limitations on the spouse's
right to income to be taken into account when valuing the marital deduction.247
Fifteen of the seventeen Tax Court judges and four of the nine Supreme Court
Justices who considered Hubert agreed that the regulation is merely a valuation
provision, and that not all limitations on the spouse's right to income would be
material.24 Three other Supreme Court justices, including Justice O'Connor,
agreed that the Commissioner had created a quantitative rule for regulation
section 20.2056(b)-4(a), worthy of deference, such that a limitation on the right
to receive income would affect the marital deduction "only upon reaching a
certain quantum of substantiality."249
The Per Se Method would be inconsistent with Treasury Regulation section
20.2056(b)-4(a) as currently written, which contemplates that some limitations
on a surviving spouse's right to income will not require the marital deduction to
be reduced. Without the regulation as currently written, there is no basis at all for
reducing the marital deduction by the amount of administration expenses charged
to income. As members of the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Section of
Taxation explain in their comment letter, "[t]he Supreme Court did not question
this regulation's validity; rather, the Supreme Court considered the circumstances
under which that regulation requires a reduction of the marital and charitable
deductions."25 The Per Se Method attempts to stretch regulation section
20.2056(b)-4(a) beyond its interpreted meaning as a valuation provision. Similar
to the Federal Method, this approach avoids the issue of determining what
constitutes a material limitation and instead erects a rule of absolute
prohibition.25" ' It should be rejected.
Professor Joseph M. Dodge of the University of Texas School of Law
advocates an approach that would reach a result somewhat similar to the Per Se
Method. Like the NYSBA, he would eliminate the concept of a material limitation
on income from Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) and would instead
move it to the regulations that govern whether an interest in a POA or QTIP trust
qualifies for the marital deduction.252 Professor Dodge would then rewrite the
245. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1135 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
246. See supra note 124.
247. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (as amended in 1994). See also supra note 8 for a
reproduction of the regulation.
248. See Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1131 (plurality opinion); Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner,
101 T.C. 314, 324-25 (1993).
249. Hubert, 117 S. Ct. at 1138 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 16.
251. See id. 19.
252. See Dodge, supra note 217, 14.
The "material limitation" rule doesn't belong in Reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a).
Under the current version of Reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a), the full phrase is
"material limitation upon [the surviving spouse's] right to income." The surviving
spouse has an identifiable "right to income" only in the case of power-of-
appointment and QTIP trusts under section 2056(b)(5) and (7). There is no
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regulation so that the value of the marital deduction would be reduced by the
present value of the maximum amount of future administration expenses that
might be charged (under local law and the governing instrument) against the
principal or the income of a marital bequest during a reasonable period of
administration.253 Like Judge Halpern of the Tax Court, who wrote a concurring
and dissenting opinion in Hubert,"54 Professor Dodge argues that the date of death
value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse is equal to the "present value
of all future returns, both 'principal' and 'income."' 255 Therefore, he argues, the
possibility of diverting principal or income from the surviving spouse reduces the
value passing and should reduce the marital deduction.256
Professor Dodge's comment letter is well-reasoned, his analysis of the existing
statutory and regulatory framework is very thorough, and his focus on the policy
behind the marital deduction when discussing what the law should be is unique
among the commentators. 7 For these reasons his argument is quite convincing.
However, Professor Dodge does not explain how to determine, as of the
decedent's date of death, the maximum amount of future administration expenses
that might be charged against the marital bequest. This question would be easy
to answer if the governing instrument prohibited the executor from charging any
administration expenses against the income or principal of the marital bequest.
However, such a provision might be inconsistent with the executor's state law
fiduciary duty to balance the interests of all beneficiaries. Even if the governing
instrument allowed a fixed percentage of administration expenses to be charged
to the marital bequest, rather than giving the executor discretion to determine the
amount, the future administration expenses would not be known. If the marital
deduction were reduced based on a fixed percentage of projected administration
expenses, the executor would run the risk of creating a taxable estate where none
exists, as explained by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Hubert.2
3
separate "right to income" in an outright bequest, a bequest of an annuity, an
estate trust, or a spousal remainder trust. Whether a bequest carries with it estate
income (as opposed to trust income) is a question of state law; any income that
"goes" with the bequest is part of the bequest.
Id. (alteration and parenthetical in original).
253. See id.
254. See supra note 147.
255. Dodge, supra note 217, 5.
256. Id. 10.
257. See generally id.
It is not necessary to argue that estate administration expenses are literal
"encumbrances" within section 2056(b)(4)(B). It is only necessary to note that
they reduce the "value passing" to the surviving spouse under section 2056(a) and
that they do not represent waste or consumption by the surviving spouse....
... Every dollar of income used to pay administration expenses is a dollar that
does not appear in the surviving spouse's estate and gift tax base. Such a result
clearly violates the rationale of the marital deduction.
Id. 12, 19.
258. See supra note 203.
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Because of these practical problems, the IRS and Treasury should reject this
approach.
3. The Safe Harbor Method
The approach most favored by practitioners who responded to the IRS's request
for comments, 259 and the one that should be adopted in proposed regulations, is
the Safe Harbor Method of determining when a material limitation on a surviving
spouse's right to income exists. This is the only alternative of the three proposed
by the IRS that actually attempts to answer the question left open in Hubert by
focusing on the level of administration expenses charged to income relative to the
size of the marital bequest. It would also be practical, relatively easy to
administer, and would provide certainty in an area where none currently exists.
While there seems to be some consensus that the regulations should adopt a
Safe Harbor Method, there is disagreement about what the exact test should be.
No commentator suggests that the methods proposed by the IRS in Notice 97-63,
either a percentage of the actual gross income derived from the marital bequest
property during administration, or a specified dollar amount,260 should be
adopted. More than one commentator expresses concern that the former test might
improperly influence executors by causing them to administer estates less
expeditiously, fund bequests and trusts less promptly, and alter estates'
investment strategies, all with an eye toward income production.26'
Professor Dodge, while advocating his own approach,262 suggests that if a safe
harbor method were adopted it should be based on a small percentage of the value
of the marital bequest, rather than on a percentage of actual or projected
income.263 Other commentators suggest safe harbor approaches based on a sliding
scale of the net value (reduced for claims, debts, and funeral expenses) passing
259. In addition to the practitioners discussed in this Part, the Safe Harbor Method is favored
by two other commentators. See Letter from Roger M. Norman et al., Law Offices of Roger M.
Norman, to Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 10, 1997), in 98 TAXNoTs TODAY 10-12, Jan. 15,
1998, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File; Colella, supra note 220.
260. I.R.S. Notice 97-63, 1997-47 I.R.B. 6.
261. See Dodge, supra note 217, 18; Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation, supra note
230, 5.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 252-56.
263. See Dodge, supra note 217, 18. Professor Dodge suggests that income could be used
to pay administration expenses as long as the amount so used did not exceed .2% of the value
of the marital bequest; he reasoned that the de minimis safe harbor amount should be about 5%
multiplied by an average income yield for trusts of around 4%. If that safe harbor limit were
exceeded, his preferred test would be invoked and the marital deduction would be reduced by
"the present value of ALL charges that might lawfully be made against the principal and
income of the marital bequest." Id. 18 (emphasis in original).
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to the surviving spouse or to charity,2" or on state-prescribed "normal levels" of
administration expenses. 265
The most promising safe harbor tests are suggested by members of the ABA's
Real Property, Probate, & Trust Law Section ("Probate Section") and members
of the Estate and Gift Tax Committee of the ABA's Section of Taxation ("Tax
Section"). The tests they advocate are very similar.
Members of the Probate Section suggest that the safe harbor be calculated as
a percentage of the projected lifetime income the surviving spouse will receive
from the marital deduction property. The projected income would be calculated
based on the date-of-death value of the marital bequest, the surviving spouse's
age, and an interest rate set by the IRS. They suggest that the safe harbor
percentage should be ten to fifteen percent of the projected lifetime income. 6
Members of the Tax Section would make a similar calculation, but would use
projected income during a reasonable (three-year) period of administration. They
suggest a safe harbor percentage of 33% based on Hubert, where administration
expenses of $1.5 million were charged to the $4.5 million of income earned
during administration.267 They also suggest an additional safe harbor based on
Hubert, whereby an amount of incone equal to five percent of the value of the
assets qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions could be used to pay
administration expenses.6 8 The executor would be able to use whichever test
yields a larger safe harbor amount.269
Under both the Probate and Tax Sections' versions, the marital deduction
would be reduced dollar for dollar by the amount of administration expenses
actually charged to income in excess of the safe harbor amount, unless the
executor carried his burden of proof in showing why, under the particular facts
and circumstances, it was proper to charge the excess amount to income. 7 0 Both
of these approaches are fairly straightforward. The Probate Section's method is
264. See Memo from Stanley Efron and Stephen L. Hopkins to Internal Revenue Service
(Feb. 3, 1998), in 98 TAx NoTEs TODAY 39-74, Feb. 27, 1998, 9 15, available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, TNT File. Specifically, the maximum amount that would be chargeable
against the property passing to the surviving spouse or to charity (as reflected on the estate tax
return) without affecting the amount of the marital or charitable deduction would be 2.5% of
the first $1 million, 2% of the next $1 million, 1.5% of the next $1 million, and 1% of the value
above $3 million. See id. The attorneys describe this approach as an "empirically based
estimate" of reasonable estate administration expenses that "recognizes economies of scale
whereby fixed costs are largely the same regardless of the size of the estate or the nature of the
property passing to the spouse" or charity. Id. $ 16. It ignores the distinction between principal
and income and allows an executor to determine the maximum charge against the property
based on the estate tax return, regardless of the amount of income earned during administration.
See id. 9 14.
265. Letter from David D. Aughtry, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin, to
Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 4, 1998), in 98 TAX NoTES TODAY 39-75, Feb. 27, 1998, 3,
available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File.
266. See ABA Section of Real Property, supra note 224, 9% 24-26.
267. See ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 68, 26.
268. See id. 28.
269. See id. 9 23.
270. See id. 33; ABA Section of Real Property, supra note 224, $ 28.
[Vol. 74:317
THE UNCERTAINTY OF DEATH AND TAXES
slightly more complicated than the Tax Section's, because it does not assume a
reasonable period of administration, but instead uses the surviving spouse's life
expectancy to calculate projected income. The slight complication is nothing new
in the tax world, and in this situation is justified because the Probate Section's
approach is more tailored to the facts of individual estates.
CONCLUSION
In one sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Hubert did little to resolve the
issue of how estate tax marital and charitable deductions should be valued when
income allocable to marital and charitable bequests is used to pay estate
administration expenses. Because the Commissioner argued only that any use of
such income constituted a material limitation on a surviving spouse's right to
income, the justices' rejection of this per se argument necessarily resulted in a
holding for the estate, without requiring the justices to resolve the valuation
issue.
2 71
In a more positive sense, however, Hubert is an example of the collaborative
model of statutory interpretation, whereby "judges play a creative role in
developing the law" by interpreting the meaning of statutes through cases. 272 The
Hubert Court began the process of collaboration with respect to Treasury
regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) by determining that the regulation is a
valuation provision,2 " and by determining that the word "material" refers to an
as yet undefined "quantum of substantiality."274 With this foundation, Justice
O'Connor invited the Treasury Department and the IRS to amend regulation
section 20.2056(b)-4(a) to provide taxpayers and their advisors with clear
guidance about what constitutes a material limitation on a surviving spouse's
right to income.
2 75
In keeping with a spirit of collaboration and teamwork, Treasury and the IRS
solicited comments about proposed methods of determining materiality, and many
practitioners responded with thoughtful and insightful remarks.2 76 The method
that should be adopted in the amended regulation, a variation of one of the
methods proposed by Treasury and the IRS, would allow a safe harbor amount of
administration expenses to be charged to the income of a marital or charitable
bequest without requiring the marital or charitable deduction to be reduced. Such
a bright-line method would be easy to understand and easy to administer.2 77 To
be sure, whichever method is finally adopted, the real result of Hubert is that the
new law on valuing estate tax marital and charitable deductions will be the
271. See supra Part I.C.
272. William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 541, 579 (1988).
273. See supra Part I.C (discussing the plurality opinion).
274. See supra Part I.C (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion).
275. See Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124, 1139 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
276. See supra Part V.B.
277. See supra Part V.B.3.
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product of current and lively public deliberation, an outcome championed by the
collaborative model of statutory interpretation. 8
278. See Popkin, supra note 272, at 590.
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